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Abstract: There has been considerable debate on the left in Latin America.
This paper argues that the distinction between lefts is symptomatic of a larger
problematic distinction in academic literature, that of regime types. The author
reviews typologies presented by Juan Linz, Larry Diamond, and Peter Smith and
Melissa Ziegler, before offering an alternative typology. According to that typology,
Chile is an embedded liberal democracy, Brazil is a semi-embedded managed
republic, and Venezuela is a semi-embedded heavily managed republic. These
distinctions help not only understand the different lefts within the countries but
also their.
Keywords: Typologies, Left Regimes, Economic Management.
Resumo: É recorrente o debate sobre governos de esquerda na AmØrica Latina.
O presente artigo argumenta que a distinçªo entre alguns regimes de esquerda
na referida regiªo Ø sintomÆtica e passível de crítica na literatura acadŒmica.
Nesse sentido, o autor resgata as tipologias de Juan Linz, Larry Diamond e Peter
Smith e Melissa Ziegler, bem como apresenta uma tipologia alternativa. Confor-
me essa tipologia, os governos de esquerda do Brasil, Chile e Venezuela podem
ser caracterizados, respectivamente, como uma democracia liberal consolida-
da, uma repœblica ligeiramente administrada semi-consolidada e uma repœbli-
ca excessivamente administrada semi-consolidada. A anÆlise dos governos des-
ses países ajuda-nos nªo somente a entender a lógica dos regimes de esquerda,
mas, tambØm, a distinçªo entre eles.
Palavras-chave: Tipologia, Regimes de Esquerda, Economia Administrada.
JEL Classification: H11; P4.
1 Introduction
Between December 2005 and December 2006, 11 countries in
Latin America held presidential elections and the electoral results
for candidates on the political left were better than at any time since
the latest wave of democratization in Latin America began in 1979
* Assistant Professor at Montclair State University and Adjunct Assistant Professor at New York
University, USA. E-mail: spanakos@gmail.com. The author thanks Fernando Ferrari Filho,
Javier Corrales, Steve Levitsky, Sarah El-Kazaz and Michael Coppedge for their comments
on this paper and earlier drafts.
246  Revista AnÆlise Econômica, Porto Alegre, ano 26, n. 50, p. 245-273, setembro de 2008.
(CASTAÑEDA; NAVIA, 2007). News analysts and academics
wondered whether Latin America had truly shifted to the left, what
such a shift would mean, and what  after the end of the Cold War, the
beginning of the war on terror, and the post-Washington consensus
 the term left meant.
Castaæeda and Navia (2007), building on Castaæeda (1994),
argued that there were two lefts in Latin America: one institutional,
responsible, and moderate, and one populist, anti-institutional, and
combative. The distinction has been adopted by many analysts even
though scholars critique it heavily. Cleary (2007) writes that the only
president in Latin America who truly fits the populist left model is
Venezuelan president Hugo ChÆvez. Petras (2006), seems to agree
that ChÆvez is the lone leftist in the hemisphere, while offering a
seething critique of false leftists. Interestingly enough, Castaæeda
told Science & Society that he does not see a left in Venezuela
(CASTAÑEDA, 2005). Schamis (2006) suggests going beyond the idea
of two lefts and analyzing the degree of institutionalization of the party
system to explain differences among the left and Reid puts the battle
in Latin America, not in terms of left or right but populists and
institutio-nalists (see also REID, 2008).
Clearly, scholars are trying to explain differences within Latin
America that are relatively elusive. This paper argues that social
science suffers from typologies that are not adequate for comparing
polities in the contemporary world. The inadequacy of these typologies
has made a growth industry of creating adjectives for deficient
democracies as well as for other micro and mesolevel distinctions 
such as between lefts, party institutionalization, and so on. This paper
proposes a new typology which places Latin American countries in
different spaces along continua. It then places Chile, Brazil, and
Venezuela in these spaces. A more precise typology helps explain
the more visible differences in party ideology and presidential
behavior, among other aspects. That is, ChÆvez appears more populist,
anti-instutionalist, and radically democratic than do Brazilian and
Chilean presidents Luis InÆcio Lula da Silva and Michele Bachelet
because he is the president of a different regime.
2 Typologies
Ninety countries have transitioned towards democracy in the
current global wave of democratization (HUNTINGTON, 1991,
DIAMOND, 2008, p. 36). While in the 1980s these transitions were met
with optimism, by the 1990s scholars began to find a need to address
247Spanakos, A. Que regime Ø este? The left in Brazil, Chile and Venezuela
cases where democratization had begun but not finished. Scholars
analyzing new democracies soon began to apply adjectives to
democracies to explain in what way a regime missed the mark of
being a true democracy (COLLIER; LEVITSKY, 1997). That is, as
opposed to parliamentary or federal democracy, regimes were
labeled delegative (ODONNELL, 1999), illiberal (ZAKARIA, 1997),
or electoral caudilloist (CLOSE, 2004), with the adjective implying
what made this regime somewhat less than democratic (COLLIER;
LEVITSKY, 1997, p. 431).
Without question, the significant increase in governments using
mechanisms to give citizens voice overwhelmed scholars. But, as Collier
and Levitsky (1997) argue, scholars should avoid simply creating new
adjectives to describe particularities of one regime or one moment for
a particular regime. This advice has not been heeded1  and the problems
associated with analyzing contemporary regimes are reflective of a
problem of typology.
The most influential typology of political regimes for much of the
twentieth century was conceived by Juan Linz (2000). He distin-
guished Francoist Spain from Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union
in terms of the source of its legitimacy and the means of organizing
state-society relations, differences that were so significant that it
constituted an altogether different regime type (MUNCK; SNYDER,
2007). This challenged the dominant democracy-totatilitarian typology
and created the critical authoritarian category which is ubiquitous
today. Linz explained that authoritarian regimes could be identified
by two factors: 1) the degree or type of limited political pluralism
under such regimes and 2) degree to which such regimes are
based on political apathy and demobilization of the population or
limited and controlled mobilizations (LINZ, 2000, p. 54). Totalitarian
governments, he argued, relied on low pluralism, but on high degrees
of mobilization and ideology.2 So different were totalitarian and
authoritarian governments that each could be identified as a regime
and, along with democracy, they constituted the three basic forms of
modern government (LINZ, 2000, p. 143).3
Though Linz was correct in separating authoritarian from totali-
tarian governments, his typology was clearly based on phenomena
related to the modernization and urbanization taking place in the
semi-developed and developing countries at the time. In retrospect,
1 For more see Spanakos (2006).
2 In this he differed from other scholars addressing the issue of totalitarianism who identified its
uniqueness in its attempt to control the totality of its citizens lives (Linz, 2000, p. 72).
3 A few other types of regimes existed but they were primarily traditional (this included
sultanistic and caudillist regimes).
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Linzs totalitarian is hardly a separate regime type, but should be
considered a particular variant of authoritarian regime. The fact is,
since the death of Stalin and with the exception of the Cultural
Revolution in China, there have been few, if any, totalitarian regimes
in the world according to his definition. If anything, totalitarian
ideological and mobilizational forms tend to be ephemeral. More
troubling than the use of totalitarianism as a basic type of regime is
Linzs creation of multiple descriptive subtypes which overlap. For
example, while the Brazilian government might easily be identified
as a democracy with potential problems in stateness (LINZ; STEPAN,
1996), Iran could be sui generis, post-totalitarian, totalitarian,, pre-
totalitarian, post-inde-pendence mobilizational, or even a pseudo-
democracy. Similarly, Venezuela could be a plebiscitarian
democracy, populist, authori-tarian democracy, organic
democracy or a majoritarian demo-cracy. In other words, there
are too many subtypes with descriptive definitions that overlap too
easily. Rather than classify and organize, this typology encourages
the proliferation of new categories and exaggerates the number of
regime types and subtypes.
A corrective is presented by Larry Diamond, one of the most
active senior scholars writing about democratization. He uses Karls
(1995) concept of hybrid regimes and Collier and Ways (2002)
incorporation of competitiveness into typologies, in creating what is
the most dominant typology. Beginning with a concept of democracy
limited to one dimension  freedom of political opponents  he creates
a continuum including liberal democracy, electoral democracy,
competitive authoritarian, and noncompetitive authoritarian regimes.
As one moves from liberal democracy there is an ordinal worsening
of political and civil rights, as measured by Freedom House. Elections
may indeed be present in all of these governments, something
unanticipated by Linz (DIAMOND, 2002, p. 24), but the presence of
elections does not render a regime democratic.4
Electoral democracy represents a minimal framework in which
political and civil rights exist, but may not be sufficiently institutio-
nalized to qualify as liberal democracy. Thus, liberal democracy
corresponds with the lowest scores in Freedom House rankings for
civil and political rights (under a 2 in each category), whereas slightly
higher scores correspond with electoral democracies (between 2
4 In his introductory essay (2000), rather than eliminate empty categories and refine his
typology, Linz expands the number of subtypes creating more descriptive types which overlap
quite significantly with existing alternatives.
5 Obviously, the scores on Peru are quite faulty and Freedom House has significantly revised
their estimations.
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and 4). Diamond differentiates (see Table 1 below) Peru, the Czech
Republic, and Canada as being the former, whereas Brazil, India,
and the Philippines fall into the latter.5
Competitive authoritarian regimes hold elections which are less
free and fair than those in electoral democracies, but they nonetheless
contain the possibility of opposition victory (scoring between 4-6 on FH
indicators). These are regimes where, according to Levitsky and Way,
formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the principal
means of obtaining and exercising political authority. Incumbents
violate those rules so often and to such an extent, however, that the
regime fails to meet conventional minimum standards for democracy
(2002, p.53). The pre-Color Revolutions Ukraine, Georgia and
Kyrgyzstan are examples of this. Here, the possibility of change is almost
completely absent from noncompetitive authoritarian governments
without considerable opposition strength and probably also
international pressure (DIAMOND, 2002, p. 24). This particular hybrid
regime corresponds to what Schedler calls electoral authoritarianism
(2006). Though election results are not the only consideration,
consistently very high electoral support for ruling parties is a tell-tale
sign. Diamond cites ruling party success of repeatedly over 95
percent in Singapore, about 80 percent in Egypt in 2000 and
Mauritania in 2001, 89 percent in Tanzania in 2000, and repeated
over 80 percent in Tunisia during the 1990s (2002, p. 32) as evidence
of electoral authoritarianism.
He adds two more possibilities to the original four sub-types:
ambiguous regimes (somewhere between electoral democracy and
competitive democracy, FH 3-5) and politically closed authoritaria-
nism (FH 7). He lists the Ukraine, Nigeria and Venezuela as ambiguous
regimes because there is considerable scholarly disagreement over
Table 1. Diamonds Typology of Regimes
Source: Diamond (2002).
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where to put them and it seems a little too early to make a judgement.
Politically closed authoritarian systems do not even make the pretense
of elections and are therefore considered different.
There are some immediate conceptual problems with this scheme.
To begin with, it is not clear whether the typology is designed to classify
existing regimes or electoral regimes. The inclusion of politically closed
authoritarianism is explained because it does not fit in with the other
types (it has no elections) but it is not explained in relationship to the
typology. For example, there is opposition though it may have even
fewer freedoms and civil rights seem less respected than the opposition
in electoral authoritarian systems. But it is not clear that the existence
or absence of universally considered meaningless elections justifies an
additional type. The reader must wonder whether the two final types
are not actually the same type in differing degrees.
The discussion of ambiguous regimes is also troubling. It is not
clear whether ambiguous regimes are ambiguous because scholars
disagree or because it is too soon to tell, implying a transition. Diamond
suggests both reasons (2002, p. 23). Scholarly agreement, however,
does not seem the best explanatory factor for the meaning (nominal
definition) of a type, even if it may be used in assigning cases
(classificatory function). Prior to Linzs formulation of totalitarian re-
gimes, scholars uniformly divided the world into democratic and
totalitarian governments, and Diamonds use of Freedom House data
led him to identify Peru under Fujimori as a liberal democracy
(MUNCK; SNYDER, 2007). This is especially so since hybrid regimes
by their very nature are between cases which fit snugly into neither
one ideal type or the other. Thus, the label ambiguous because of
lack of scholarly consensus does not seem well grounded. It is better
to identify regime characteristics as continuous and locate ambi-
guous regimes on or just over the border between ideal types.
If temporality is being, the variables being measured are no
longer respect for civil and political rights but the direction in which
those variables, and potentially others, are seen as going. While it is
important to include an indicator to accommodate change and how
that might undermine or strengthen state ability and commitment in
protecting rights, it is not clear that this need be included in identifying
regime type. Rather, it could be (see below) a very important indicator
for qualifiying how stable a regime is. After all, transitions occur in
democracies (LINZ; STEPAN, 1978) and in non-democracies
(ODONNELL, SCHMITTER, WHITEHEAD, 1986). Moreover, crisis 
internal or not, economic, social, political, and so on  occurs in all
governments and can create a new environment which is hard to judge.
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The post- September 11 era in the US changed many of the prevailing
perceptions of the scope and depth of government power and citizen
rights. One would hardly say that the US in 2002, or since, has been
an ambiguous regime, even though scholars recognize a different
environment and do not agree on its ultimate meaning.
In fact, that regimes are considered ambiguous suggests that there
might be something missing from the typology. Here, not only is
conceptual refinement suggested (as in the previous paragraphs)
but also expansion and indexation. Levitsky and Way distinguish El
Salvador, Latvia, and the Ukraine, each of which scored a combined
6 from Freedom House (counting both political and civil rights). Yet
these regimes differed in fundamental ways. Whereas in Latvia the
principal undemocratic feature was the absence of citizenship rights
for people of Russian descent, in El Salvador the main undemocratic
features included substantial human rights violations and the absence
of civilian control over the military. Ukraine possessed both univer-
sal citizenship rights and a civilian-controlled military, but civil liberties
were frequently violated and incumbents routinely abused or mani-
pulated democratic procedures (LEVITSKY; WAY, 2002, p. 52). Since
the main concern of the Diamond typology is intended to be the
rights of the opposition and political rights are immediately more
important in being electoral, Diamonds typology should, at least,
be indexed giving more weight to political rights. This would have
an immediate effect on clarifying ambiguous cases and would also
reduce the difference between noncompetitive regimes.
This is not to say that civil rights should not be considered. Perhaps
this could also justify a case for expansion. Rather than indexing civil
and political rights, Diamond could essentially separate them into two
dimensions. Place barriers to political participation on one axis and
recognition of universal rights of citizens might allow for El Salvador,
Latvia, and the Ukraine in ways that recognized their similarity in
authoritarian without losing sight of their differences.
A more recent revision of the Diamond scheme is contained in
Smith (2004) and Smith and Ziegler (2008). In the latter, Smith and
Ziegler distinguish regimes on the basis of how free and fair elections
are, and the extensiveness of citizen rights (see Table 2). Here, Smith
and Ziegler, following Zakaria (1997) and Levitsky and Ways (2002),
distinguish civil and political rights. The result is a more precise
classificatory system. For example, under the Diamond scheme, in 2008
(FH scores of {2,2}, {1,1} and {4,4} respectively), Brazil and Chile
would be both be liberal democracies (Brazil close to an electoral
democracy) and Venezuela an ambiguous regime. Under the Smith
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Table 2. Smith and Zieglers Typology of Regimes
Source: Smith and Ziegler (2008).
and Ziegler correction, Chile and Brazil would be liberal democracies
(again Brazil close to the border), and Venezuela would be an illiberal
semi-democracy.
Oddly enough, though the typology is more precise, it produces
a certain amount of confusion because of mislabeling. For example,
democracy is identified by how free and fair elections are while
liberalness is identified by depth and breadth of citizen rights. But
democracy is best understood by the ability (and willingness under
some definitions) of citizens to participate in politics. Elections are a
mechanism through which citizens may participate but they are not,
in themselves, sufficient for making a regime democratic. Similarly,
liberalism assumes the fundamental autonomy and irredu-cibility of
the individual and the universalization of the status of the individual
citizen. A regime is liberal when it respects individuals vis-à-vis
minorities, it limits its own exercise of power, and all indivi-duals are
treated equally before the state. The degree to which the rights of citizens
are expanded or not is better identified with progressive as opposed
to liberal politics. The Freedom House indicator for civil rights
supports this critique in that civil rights are seen readings of amount
of freedom within a country not progressive growth of freedom. On
their webpage, they write Civil liberties allow for the freedoms of
expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule
of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state
and a rating of 1 indicates the highest degree of freedom and 7 the
lowest level of freedom.
Smith and Ziegler are correct in identifying democracy and
liberalness as fundamental indicators, but more precise definitions
and labeling are necessary. An alternative typology is proposed here
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which attempts to do this. It aims to identify regimes on the basis of
how much independence citizens have vis-à-vis the regime that
governs them (democraticness and liberalness). Regimes are then
qualified by how embedded the type of rule, produced by the first
two indicators, is.
3 An Alternative Typology
The Aristotelian ideal of ruling and being ruled is used to identify
democracy as the regime in which citizen agency is greatest. At the
other extreme, is a situation where citizens are exclusively ruled and
take no part in ruling. At this end, citizens are coerced by their
government and have no political autonomy. As citizen agency
increases, government involves citizens in minimal ways through
consultation, a one-way, top-down, mechanism. There is a significant
change as citizens are regularly given opportunities to choose
representatives and have limited means of expressing voice and
holding representatives accountable. Finally, at its strongest, distinctions
between rulers and ruled evaporate as citizens are constitutive of
the government itself. Such a regime is democratic, since its citizens
are truly ruling and being ruled. In its ideal form it exists nowhere,
but lesser degrees of democracy can be found in the real world.
Governments that limit citizen agency to objects of coercion or
involvement in small-scale consultation are authoritarian in that
rule is alien to citizens. A large middle category is the republic which
mediates citizenship through representatives and where the amount
of citizen agency varies considerably depending on local culture,
history of contestation, and institutional structures. The category of
republic obviously contains considerable variation within it,
however, combining this single variable with others allows for greater
differentiation. Variation in culture, politics of contestation, and
institutions effects the quality of regime performance, but does not
necessarily change the regime itself.
The second variable aims to capture the amount of liberalness
in a society. Since Zakaria (1997) and also Pan (2006), scholars have
associated universality of citizenship, the use of rule of law to protect
minorities, the individualization of citizens (as opposed to communal
or group definitions), and limited government with liberalism parti-
cularly in regard to recognition of a division between public and
private space. No major political theorist has ever endorsed democracy
without some limitation upon government and the rise of modern
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Table 3. Citizen Agency and Socio-Economic Management
Source: Authors elaboration.
democracy is inextricably linked to the rise of liberalism (ZAKARIA,
1997). Certainly, the case for democracy, especially in a modern
world would hardly be credible without some aspect of liberalism,
something that was acknowledged by the Federalists and Tocqueville,
among others.
What is proposed here is oiko-political management. That is,
how deep into the household does governance enter and to what
extent are decisions that liberals consider private, supervised by
the government. The emphasis here is on two fundamental aspects of
the household: worship and participation in the market. Freedom in
these two areas is certainly correlated, but the two areas also diverge
in a number of cases that are important. Economic conservatism
can occur alongside religious pluralism (New Deal US) or significant
management of religious practices (post revolutionary Iran).
Economic liberalism seems most likely to occur alongside religious
pluralism (New Labour UK) but post-Mahathirs Malaysia is an
example of liberalism coexists with management of religious groups
and life. These issues are especially important amidst highly contro-
versial global debates over economic liberalization and its alternative
and secularization and the rise of religious fundamentalism. Indeed,
many ambiguous regimes are precisely where these debates are
most heated. There are many other areas of the household that can
be managed by the government, for example recognition of what a
household is, but these two areas are distinctive in that religious and
economic liberty were the earliest and most fundamental liberties to
emerge in the history of liberalism. Regimes that allow the most liberty
in economic and religious decisions of individuals are liberal. As
regimes intervene more into these realms, they increasingly manage
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citizens oiko-political affairs and employ a concept of citizenship
that is increasingly communal.
The following table locates and names the nine possibilities
created by these two dimensions.
There is however, the issue of change that must be considered.
For example, while Russia, China, and Malaysia all display similar
types of state-society relations, the amount of legitimacy of these re-
gimes differs considerably. All three states have undergone transitions
since the late 1990s, Malaysia and China towards more open political
regimes (though starting from vastly different positions) and Russia
towards a more closed political regime. Of the three, the regime in
Malaysia seem most stable, while there is concern about uncertainty
of Chinas political future and the succession question pursued the
Putin regime in Russia until he became prime minister. Though both
are managed republics, Brazilian citizens have more potential to rule
themselves than do Turks where popular sovereignty is checked by a
prominent veto player (the armed forces). This limitation not only makes
Turkey less republican but also affects its legitimacy, particularly for
those who oppose secular rule. If a system of elections consistently
prescribes the choices of citizens or fails to address perceived needs,
the regime will continue to be a republic, but will be a very fragile
one. This was certainly the case of Venezuela in 1992 where a
population that believed strongly in democracy welcomed two coup
attempts (CANACHE, 2002).
Thus, the typology proposed above should be complemented
by some indicator of how embedded the regime is. Social network
analysts use the term embeddedness to establish how deeply
absorbed social networks are, how capable they are in engendering
trust, norms, and producing credible expectations for social action
(GRANOVETTER, 1985). Similarly, Evans (1995) argues that state
performance is linked to embedded autonomy, which is dependent
upon strong links between the state and networks of business sectors.
Extending the idea towards typology, a regime may be considered
embedded when the idea of its rule, the norms that support that
rule, and the actors and institutions that are critical to that rule, have
become accepted as correct and good. It is, in short, the degree to
which a regime can reproduce the norms, values, institutions (formal
and informal) that reinforce its rule across a given territory.
Rule may be quite stable without consensus about it being correct
and good, so long as there is no compelling, realistic alternative (see
HARDIN, 1989), but such a rule is not necessarily embedded. It is
that particular type of regime which suddenly and drastically changes
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as was the case in Iran in 1979. Iran is instructive because the crisis
of the Pahlavi regime created the possibilities for the Khomeini regi-
me which replaced it. In fact, it is through often crises that the
boundaries which will eventually define a regime are established
(HAY, 1999) which is why accounting for regime change is so funda-
mental for understanding typologies.
Embeddedness is separated from regime type because it does
not impact the type of regime but it is important in terms of identifying
how stable or transitional a particular regime is. Rapid changes do
occur in regime types, though it is relatively rare (SMITH; ZIEGLER,
2008, p. 39). However, regimes that are not well-embedded can and
do change. Calling something a republic or a democracy does not
help identify how tenable it is. Adjectival regimes can be the result
of being transitional but they can also be the result of an absence of
change.6 It is the task of the scholar to say that 2 years after the fall of X
junta this government is a republic but it is not well embedded or 20
years after the fall of the X junta, the government continues to have a
republican structure, but it is an authoritarian regime and, moreover,
that regime is embedded.
Table 4 classifies potential regimes according to this typology
and it italicizes empty cells indicating regimes that are potential but
nonexistent. It is based upon using Freedom Houses political rights as
a proxy for citizen agency, measures of economic freedom from the
Heritage Foundation and restrictions on religious freedom from Brian
Grims database for liberalness, and embeddedness is a averaged
score of government effectiveness and political stability as measured
by the World Bank Governance Indicators.7 These indicators are
imperfect but, for large N work, they provide enough data for
reasonable classification.
There are very few embedded liberal authoritarian, embedded
managed democracies, embedded managed republics, and shallow
communitarian republics and there are no shallow/semi-embedded
liberal authoritarian, nor semi-embedded/embedded communitarian
republics, nor liberal republics or command democracies whatsoever.
The most common forms tend to be embedded liberal democracies,
shallow/semi-embedded/embedded managed republics, shallow/
6 Huntington (1991) considered hybrid regimes to be inherently unstable but Case (2005)
found ample evidence in Southeast Asia of stable hybrid regimes.
7 For Freedom House Rankings see http://freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw/FIVVAllScores.xls.
Sent to author on June 12, 2007. Index of Economic Freedom see http://www.heritage.org/
research/features/incex/countries.cfm. Accessed on November 11, 2007. Religious restrictions
from The Cities of God Versus the Countries of Earth: The Restriction of Religious Freedom
(RRF) Index. Unpublished paper. For the World Bank Governance Indicators see note 7.
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semi-embedded/embedded vanguard authoritarian regimes, and
shallow/semi-embedded totalitarian regimes. That regimes are most
likely along a line that defines a positive relationship between
citizenness and oiko-political management should not be surprising
because there tends to be a strong correlation between degree of
liberalness and free participation. This does not prevent the possibility
of identifying more and less managed authoritarian regimes, or
Table 4. Regime Types
Source: Authors elaboration.
allowing for the (rare) possibility of communitarian republics and
managed democracies. The former are far more common than the
latter, but a typology should be capable of including both without
carelessly compressing them into other categories.
4 Three Lefts or Three (Two and a half) Regimes: Chile, Brazil,
Venezuela
An empirical application of this typology to three Latin American
cases is instructive. The three cases are identified as follows: Chile is
considered a liberal democracy, and Brazil and Venezuela are
managed republics though separated by considerable space. Before
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analyzing these cases, it is important to highlight the continuous nature
of the variables involved here, that boundaries between regimes
are heuristic and not discrete. For example, the Bolivarian republic
of Venezuela has democratic intentions and possibilities because
of the very considerable impetus given by the state, Constitution
(1999), and various intermediary organizations for participation. But
the efforts by the state and other actors to constrain citizen autonomy
and weaken freedom of press and other freedoms cannot be
discounted. The Brazilian democracy has lower levels of participation
and efficacy than does Venezuela (though higher levels than Chile),
but quality of participation is weakened by threats to journalists
(usually from nongovernmental actors) and the poor quality of the
police and courts. Participation in neither country is free enough to
qualify as democratic, but the restrictions on participation are much
higher in Venezuela and many of these restrictions are government-
imposed. Similarly, while the Brazilian regime has been liberalizing
Table 5. Regime Types in Brazil, Chile and Venezuela
Source: Authors elaboration.
for close to two decades, it continues to be one in which the state
plays an important role in regulating the market. Its interference in
religious matters, however, is minimal. This places Brazil towards
the more free section of managed republics. It is clearly not as
liberal as Chile, but it is far more so than Venezuela which also falls
within the category of managed.
4.1 Chile: embedded liberal democracy
Chile is an embedded liberal democracy. It consistently scores,
along with Uruguay and Costa Rica, at the highest levels in terms of
political and civil rights in the region. Its government is highly effective
and stable and the country has witnessed 4 competitive elections
whose results have been uncontested.
Prior to the 1973 coup against the Allende government, Chile
had among the longest traditions of democracy in Latin America
8 The Allende government was immediately replaced by a junta led by four men. By June of
the following year, Augusto Pinochet was declared head of state.
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and social democratic groups had significant influence in politics.
Under the Allende government (1970-1973) participation broadened
and deepened, particularly among workers groups and leftists,
and popular and government actions against private capital
increased. Resistance emerged immediately and Chile in 1973
seemed truly a nation of enemies (BERMEO, 2003, p. 139). The
Pinochet government (19748 -1990) was a brutal but largely liberal
authoritarian government. It curtailed political rights, engaged in
torture and detention against dissidents, but it also liberalized the
economy and improved government efficiency. Though a climate
of fear and repression prevailed, the government held referenda on
its status in 1978, 1980, and 1988 which affirmed support for the
Pinochet government, provided a new constitution and a phased
democratization period, and rejected a continuation of the rule of
Pinochet, respectively.
The mainstream opposition to the Pinochet government,
consisting of parties of the center-right, center, and center-left
moderated their demands to work in concert to defeat a common
foe. In doing so, they forged a common political and economic agen-
da which recognized the successes and failures of both the Allende
and Pinochet governments. The concertación of parties aimed to
maintain the macroeconomic stability of the Pinochet era, but
improve poverty reduction and reduce inequality, and to democra-
tize a technically capable state, creating an institutionalized
democratic system which would not overreach and threaten political
stability (WEYLAND, 1999). Concertación has won every presidency
since democratization and has been a model for incremental but
real change (CASTAÑEDA, 1994; CASTAÑEDA; NAVIA, 2007). Most
notably, it has more than halved the poverty rate between 1990 and
2006 (from 40 to 18%), increased health spending ten-fold, maintained
average economic growth of 5.6% and low inflation (below 10% since
1995 and below 4% since 19999 ) (SIAVELIS, 2007, p. 72). It has also
made considerable improvements in political terms by eliminating
the unelected senators (an imposition of the Pinochet Constitution),
and finding constitutional mechanisms to bringing Pinochet and
others to justice.
Some of the institutional rules from the Pinochet government
continue to impinge on the efficacy of participation. For example,
electoral rules state that a district produce two victors and that the
second candidate chosen must be from the coalition with the second
highest vote total unless the winning coalition gains two-thirds of the
9 Inflation went beyond this mark in 2008.
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11 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2007/90246.htm
votes in the district (ANGELL; REIG, 2006, p. 496). This is encourages
participation of the right within elections but it also decreases voter
efficacy. Additionally, Chileans show low levels of interest in
participation (LEVINE; MOLINA, 2007) and a relatively high level
believe their system to be corrupt (CANACHE; ALLISON, 2005). But,
as Canache and Allison argue, Chileans tend to exaggerate the
amount of corruption. Importantly, though Chileans are far from the
Aristotelian ideal in terms of actual participation, the quality of their
participation is high. That is, neither the state, political parties, nor
any other groups seem to impose participation or nonparticipation,
the press is regarded as free by Freedom House, corruption is low
(ranked 22 of 180 countries by Transparency International), and the
police and courts are largely non-partisan and function effectively.
Thus the level of participation in Chile is on the lower edge of what
might be expected in a democracy but the quality of that participation
 the absence of domination over that participation  makes a strong
case for Chile to be identified as a democracy.
The success of the Concertación government in pursuing
growth with equity was mentioned earlier. The Concertación
government has followed liberal prescriptions about a small but
effective state. It is a state that did not overturn the privatization of
social security accounts nor reverse voucher programs for education.
It increased, but continues to target, social spending and maintained
capital controls as part of a program to prevent the overvaluation of the
exchange rate, to maintain export competitiveness and to encourage
foreign investment. Tellingly, the Heritage Foundation ranks Chilean
market to be the 8th most free in the world, the best rating of any
Latin American country.
Chile appears to be a relatively conservative country and it
only legalized divorce in 2004. But religious pluralism is promoted
by the state country and Chile is not nearly as conservative as it often
appears. Public hospitals distribute free morning after pills, 50% of
births occur out of wedlock, and the age of consent is 14, though
abortions remain illegal. It is in the area of social issues that the
Bachelet government has attempted to establish its leftist credentials.
Bachelet, a single mother, was elected president following a campaign
which emphasized liberal rights including abortion, sex education,
press freedom, more transparency of government information, and
same-sex unions. Schools are required to offer twice a week religious
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instruction up until middle school, but participation is voluntary
(Department of State 2007b).10 Also a 1999 law gives all religions the
same rights that the Roman Catholic Church has in terms of chaplains
in public hospitals, prisons, and the military (Department of State
2007b).11 In all, the government does not prescribe religious affiliations
and has promoted an agenda which would weaken areas of
traditional strength by the Roman Catholic Church.
The Chilean regime that has developed since democratization
is therefore both liberal and democratic. It is also highly embedded.
The opposition to Concertación finds institutional representation in
conservative political parties and in civil society and it understands
its role as opposition within a system, in line with Linzs conception of
loyal opposition (LINZ, 1978). Electoral results are not contested
and politics are highly institutionalized. Moreover, the moderation of
the government tends to encourage moderation on the part of the
opposition (SCHAMIS, 2008). In fact, the campaign proposals of
SebastiÆn Piæera, the candidate of the united conservative opposition,
and Michelle Bachelet were remarkably similar. The World Bank
Governance Indicators reflect the degree to which the regime is
embedded in Chilean society. Political stability and government
effectiveness are ranked on the 65.9th and 85.8th percentiles,
respectively, nearly double the average for Latin America.
4.2 Brazil: Semi-embedded managed republic
The current regime in Brazil emerged as a result of a long process
of abertura that began under the military regime that governed Brazil
for 21 years (1964-1985). When the Brazilian military removed Joªo
Goulart from the presidency of Brazil, it was under the auspices of
restoring political and economic order and thwarting the Communist
threat. The Brazilian military government oversaw periods of greater
and lesser repression of dissidents and systematic use of torture and,
although highly critical of communist, it pursued largely statist economic
policies. But the Brazilian military government was institutionalist and
insisted on holding elections and compelled its opposition to com-
pete. Regular elections during the military period attested to the
institutionalized nature of military rule and the democratic pre-
tensions of Brazils political elite. Beginning with 1974, the opposition
MDB (Brazilian Democratic Movement) won significant victories in
local executive and national legislative elections. This encouraged
the military to hasten their withdrawal from politics. When the first
civilian president, JosØ Sarney, entered office a constitutional
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assembly was called to refound the republic. This assembly produced
a document full of political, civil, and economic rights, suggesting
that decentralization of power and state-led growth were synonymous
the people holding power (POWER, 2000).
Liberalization began under President Fernando Collor de Mello
(1990-1992) but did not achieve any degree of policy permanence
until Fernando Henrique Cardosos real plan (1993-1994) and his
presidency (1995-2002). Over that period, privatization of state owned
firms, deregulation of markets, flexibilization of labor markets, and
reforms of public administration aimed to holistically transform state-
society relations (SPANAKOS, 2004). Reforms, however, were piece-
meal and incomplete (PINHEIRO, 2004) and largely pragmatic in
orientation. Moreover, while price stabilization was very popular,
privatization and other reforms were not.
Brazils elections are free and results are uncontested. A second
round is held when the leading candidate does not total more votes
than the sum of his or her competitors, necessitating broad support
for candidates. Similarly, the party that represented opposition, the
Workers Party (PT), committed itself to democracy from its foundation
(NYLEN, 2003), operating as an organized and institutionalized
expression of protest. The PT has controlled the national executive
since 2003 and has maintained the system of political and economic
relations of its predecessor. PT mayors, as well as others, have established
popular assemblies which make decisions about public budgeting
(AVRITZER, 2002) increasing the quality and quantity of political
participation. Even when a breakaway group of leftists formed their
own party (PSOL), the latter remained committed to the democratic
system Brazil has maintained for two decades.
The Brazilian regime suffers from a perceived incapacity of the
government to regulate itself. Corruption has been and remains a
fundamental problem for the regime and it has worsened in recent
years. Transparency International rated Brazil 72 out of 180 countries
and the World Banks control over corruption indicator has dete-
riorated since 2004. Congressional inquiries (CPIs) are ubiquitous
and produce few convictions (they end in pizza as Brazilians say)
which has the effect of desensitizing voters to the issue of corruption
and stripping away the moral basis for government authority. Not only
have corruption scandals touched much of the national congress
and most of the figures closest to president Lula, but voters in 2006
reelected so many of the figures under investigation. More direct to
the lives of ordinary citizens, the Brazilian judiciary and policing
systems are notoriously inefficient, unjust, and corrupt. Problems with
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the justice system effect participation by reducing the perceived
efficacy as well as worsening the conditions of safety in the public
sphere wherein citizens voice their complaints. The declining
conditions for security weigh heavily in Freedom Housings ranking
of press freedom in Brazil. It is ranked 85 and partly free largely due
to the threats faced by journalists from gangs as well as intimidation
when investigating corruption charges. Violence also affects
participation as some 90 out of 600 favelas in the country are estimated
to be controlled by militias.12
The Brazilian regime is quite liberal in the area of religious freedom.
The Constitution establishes freedom of religion, there is no official
religion, and government laws criminalize anti-semitism and racism.13
Religious groups are active in civil society and function in a plural
environment exercising pressure on politicians like other organized
groups. Recently, there has been an expansion of political power
that is in the hands of an Evangelical block among Brazilian poli-
ticians, but public culture continues to be quite liberal, serving as a
space for vocal demands by womens groups and supporting parades
for gay and transvestite communities.
Despite the liberalization of the exchange rate and trade, state
presence remains considerable. The Heritage Foundation identifies
the Brazilian market as the 101st most economically free, placing it just
below the average for the Americas.14  It particularly identifies property
and labor rights, financial freedom, corruption, and government size
as being evidence of government interference with economic
freedom or government unwillingness and/or inability of defending
property claims. As a result, it finds Brazil to be mostly unfree.
Thus, although participation in Brazil is often relatively robust it
faces limitations in terms of quality because of corruption, ineffective
policing by and self-policing of the government, challenges to press
freedom and violence. For this reason, Brazil is considered a republic
that is closer towards the border of democracy than authoritarianism.
Brazil is liberal in terms of religious policies but less so in terms of
economic freedoms and so it is considered a managed economy. As
a result, Brazil is labeled a managed republic but is relatively close,
in terms of spatial identification, to Chile.
While in Brazil all political elites accept democratic processes
as the only game in town (see LINZ; STEPAN, 1996), support for
12 http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&country=7142&year=2007
13 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2007/90244.htm
14 http://www.heritage.org/Index/country.cfm?id=Brazil
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government is weak. Political elites have done little to discourage
apathy and cynicism on the part of citizens. Corruption and violence
not only reduce the quality and quantity of participation, but they
encourage anomie, withdrawal from the government. Moreover, the
lack of government governance in spaces ranging from favelas  where
government presence (if it exists) competes with non-governmental
agents  to wealthy neighborhoods where civilians assume extra-
legal rights15  serves as an obstacle to embedding the formal, legal,
and institutional rules of the regime. Finally, World Governance
Indicators for political stability and government effectiveness rate
Brazil at the 36.5 and 52.6th percentiles. As such, the political system
seems consolidated but government authority is based more on an
absence of a competing alternative than on its own legitimacy, as the
situation in many favelas suggests. For this reason, Brazil is considered a
semi-embedded, relatively close to the space of embedded regimes.
4.3 Venezuela: Semi-embedded heavily managed republic
Unlike Chile and Brazil, or most of its Latin American peers, the
Venezuelan regime is not the heir of an authoritarian government.
The managed republic formed after the signing of the Pact of Punto
Fijo governed Venezuela from 1958 until 1998. It was remarkable,
relative to other Latin American countries, in the stability of the
democratic institutions and the robust economic growth it witnessed.
By the early 1980s, the embeddedness of the managed republic
deteriorated rapidly as the democratic institutions became less
efficacious and economic growth disappeared. The decline in regi-
me legitimacy was further accelerated by massive rioting in February
of 1989 (the Cara-cazo) and two popular coup attempts in 1992
(LÓPEZ MAYA, 2005; CANACHE, 2002; LEVINE; CRISP, 1995).
Though relatively incoherent in policy proposals, over time protester
demands became increasingly clear. They rejected the elitist, party-
centered, and national government-dominated type of republic and
the liberal politics of adjustment which had been applied in fits and
starts.
Following two decades of negative economic growth and a
perception of betrayal by a distant and false democracy, rejection
of the regime and its representatives (the traditional political parties)
created a propitious situation for anti- and extra-system actors such
as Lt. Colonel Hugo ChÆvez (KELLER, 2008). Though his direct assault
on the state in 1992 was unsuccessful, his electoral campaign of 1998
15 See Roberto da Mattas writings on relational citizenship in Brazil.
265Spanakos, A. Que regime Ø este? The left in Brazil, Chile and Venezuela
was. In that campaign he promised a new constitution to create a
new republic (the Fifth Republic) in which the power relations
between state and society would be reconfigured. The Constitution
incorporated elements of direct democracy and cooperative eco-
nomic activities alongside traditional notions of representative demo-
cracy and mixed markets. Following his election in 1998, Venezuela
has held eleven national elections and referenda. There has been
an increase in political discussion and activity which offers some
validation to the Constitutional claim to be a protagonist and
participatory democracy (GARC˝A-GUADILLA 2003). But there have
been significant constraints in the protection of the autonomy of
participants in the political process as well, the result of state action,
its supporters and opponents, and criminals.
The regime of president ChÆvez claims to be moving towards
(and creating) 21st Century Socialism. Since 1999, but especially since
2002, the government produced rhetoric and then policies which aim
to increase state control over the economy and has used the resources
of the state to encourage and extort private economic agents. This is
seen, by the regime, as both a recovery of space lost during the
neoliberal period as well as a necessary step towards socialism.
The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela under Hugo ChÆvez is
very difficult to categorize but it may best be considered a heavily
managed republic. It is a republic because it has both very high levels
of democraticness in terms of participation and spaces for participa-
tion, but the quality of participation in these spaces and the regular
rejection of spaces that produce dissent reduces the efficacy of
participation. The number of elections that has taken place over the
past decade in Venezuela is astounding. President ChÆvez and his
supporters are correct in using the relatively constant electoral cycle
as a basis for comparison with the Fourth Republic where you
voted once every five years and then went home.16 Additionally,
these votes included referenda on having a constituent assembly,
the new constitution, recalling the president, and two sets of sweeping
amendments to the Constitution. Consistent with a vision of citizens
directly participating in decisions that would impact the way political
power effects their lives, the current Venezuelan regime has created
considerable space for participation. It has also created local political
16 Interview with a teacher, Barquisimeto, Venezuela, 5 March 2008.
17 During field research conducted between January and July of 2008, both supporters and
opponents of the government recognized that since ChÆvez poor people are talking about
politics more and are more aware of their rights.
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units, communal councils, which unite activities of diverse
neighborhood groups (MAINGÓN; SOSA ABASCAL, 2007) and
given them a specific institutional space within the division of powers
and resources in the republic. Most importantly, it has enabled and
facilitated the agency of many among the poor in Venezuela to engage
in political discussions, contestation, and decision-making.17  These
aspects are reflective of the importance of direct democracy and the
ideal of a protagonist citizenry in the ideology of the new regime.
At the same time, president ChÆvez regularly resorts to polarizing
the citizenry between the people and its enemies. This involves not
only rhetorical attacks on political opponents, corporations, and the
United States and its allies, but also on dissident voices that identify
themselves as part of Chavismo. The government used its resources
to stall, delegitimize, and prevent the recall referendum by
challenging the veracity of the signatures collected and, eventually,
publishing a list which included the names and identification
numbers of the people who supported the recall (the Lista Tascón).
That this list was used as a means by government agencies to
discriminate was recognized even by the president who said, in a
conciliatory moment in 2006, Thats over. Bury Tascons List. Surely
it had an important role at one time, but not now (MURPHY, 2006;
CORRALES; PENFOLD 2007). Moreover, after leaving the presidency
of the National Electoral Council, a nonpartisan position, Jorge
Rodriguez accepted the position of vice president of the Republic,
and is now the president of the party of Hugo ChÆvez, and a candidate
for mayor of one of the municipalities in Caracas. Not surprisingly,
Venezuelans, particularly opponents of the regime, doubt the secrecy
of the ballot (KELLER, 2008). The questions about the non-partisan
nature of the CNE is extended to all branches of government included
the Supreme Court and the Controllers office. ChÆvez increased
the size of the former from 20 to 32 members creating an automatic
majority. The latter is responsible for identifying politicians who are
unable to run for office (due to charges proven against them). During
the local campaigns in 2008, the controllers office was in the midst
of a huge controversy as over 250 candidates, mostly of the
opposition, were declared ineligible. This included the candidate
leading the polls for the mayorality of Caracas. Protesters wore t-
shirts with the message respect the Constitution and I decide my vote
and they marched on both the Controllers office and to the Supreme
Court to defend their political rights.
There are also many concerns about the communal councils.
President ChÆvez has spoken of changing the geography of power
267Spanakos, A. Que regime Ø este? The left in Brazil, Chile and Venezuela
and empowering local communities, but the councils are designed
in such a way to make local communities less dependent upon muni-
cipal governments but more directly dependent upon the national
executive (MAIGNÓN; SOSA ABASCAl 2007). The new geometry,
one of the potential amendments rejected in the Constitutional Refe-
rendum of 2007, places the national council of communal councils
under the presidency and places the state level and local community
councils beneath that. Not only are communal councils then vertically
linked to the presidency but a communal council cannot be a com-
munal council unless it is recognized as such by agents of the execu-
tive branch. The councils are not units that are assigned to geographic
spaces but are groups of families which organize and are then
recognized by the state. Obviously, this is a tremendous deterrent for
participation among those who are not partisans of the government.18
Participation has also been limited, particularly between 2001 and
2004, by the presence of armed bands supported by the government
and its more radical opponents. From 11-13 April 2002, in the most
extreme form of curtailing the effectiveness of participation, some
within the opposition removed the president from office and set up
an interim government after the military fired upon civilian demons-
trators. The coup is the most extreme example of such activities, but
smaller scale intimidation at rallies has occurred as well. Additionally,
street criminals also play a very important role in limiting participation.
Given that the regime identifies its legitimacy by encouraging
parliamentarism in the streets, public spaces must be safe and plural
to make such parliamentarism possible. The regime and its opponents
may be blamed for the limits of pluralism in public space, but violent
crime is an important deterrent in terms of any activity in the streets
particularly because much of civil society action revolves around
meetings and discussions after work hours when cities are far more
dangerous, especially in the barrios (shantytowns).
Finally, the environment in which the press functions also affects
the quality of participation. Defenders of the regime are correct to
say that there is freedom of the press in Venezuela in that many
opponents of the regime critically express their opinions publicly
18 The leader of a potential community council reported that she has been petitioning various
government agencies and they constantly tell her that the paperwork is insufficient and that
she should go to another agency. The process for Chavista councils, she reports, is much
easier.
19 One public intellectual said his phone had been bugged but the government never directly
limited him. Though he knew of cases where it did.
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and have not been threatened by the regime.19  But the government,
particularly the president, regularly identifies media corporations and
journalists who are unpatriotic, lying, terrorists, and enemies of
the state. In 2007, ChÆvez refused to reissue a public license for RCTV
the oldest broadcaster in Latin America. The government explained
that it wanted to use the license for a station that would be more in
the public interest and promote national programming, not for
supporting a station which played telenovelas and imported foreign
television series. But months before the license expired the president
announced on national television that he would not reissue the license
because it was a coup supporting channel (JIMÉNEZ, 2008). During
the first four months of 2008, the president and his ministers regularly
attacked the mediatic war against them, particularly the 24/7 news
channel Globovisión. This station was threatened by the president on
a weekly basis on his television show, in the National Assembly, and by
the government tax authority. Pro-government civil society painted
graffiti throughout Caracas calling the station globoterrorism and
a former police officer was found leaving explosives outside its office.
Though the government is careful not to engage in censorship
in any obvious manners, it creates a perpetual environment of threat.
These threats are institutionally validated by the denial of state
resources for projects which feature opponents of the regime and
by the Law of Responsibility of Radio and Television which
criminalizes vaguely defined irresponsible behavior by journalists.
For this reason, evaluating participation in Venezuela is
somewhat bipolar in that it contains very high potential and actual
mechanisms for participation associated with democratic regimes
as well as significant punitive mechanisms within a non-transparent
institutional environment that is more typical of an authoritarian
government. Venezuela is best understood as a republic because there
are real possibilities for efficacious participation, as seen by the
rejection of the referendum in 2007, but these possibilities can easily be
rejected by a very powerful government, as seen by the governments
reaction to the referendum.20
While the identification of the Bolivarian Republic as a republic
elicits criticisms from regime proponents and opponents alike, there
is little question about whether the regime is liberal. Its understanding
of political and civil rights and the neutrality of government institu-
20 Not its recognition of the oppositions victory, which was broadcast across the world as
evidence of ChÆvezs democratic nature, but the continuation with virtually all of the elements
which had been contained within the referendum which was rejected.
21 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2007/90271.htm
269Spanakos, A. Que regime Ø este? The left in Brazil, Chile and Venezuela
tions, as seen above, suggest it is not at all a liberal regime. It is quite
liberal in terms of religious tolerance although the hierarchy of the
Roman Catholic Church has been very critical of the government
and has been pressured by the regime and its opponents.21 But this
pressure is largely of a political nature and the government does not
endorse and reject any particular religion. That said, president ChÆvez,
on his national television show, regularly engages in contextualizing
Old Testament figures and Jesus Christ within the ethics of his socialist,
anti-capitalist, and anti-oligarchic positions. He often invites renegade
Roman Catholic priests inspired by liberation theology to validate
his musings on the subject. Though ChÆvez has a close friendship
with Iranian president Ahmadinejad (DODSON; DOORAJ 2008) and
has negatively compared Colombia to the state of Israel, he has spoken
in favor of the existence of the state of Israel and seems against anti-
Semitism within Chavismo (ELLNER, 2007).
Where the regime is decidedly anti-liberal is in the area of eco-
nomic policy. This is not surprising given ChÆvezs original economic
ruminations were profoundly anti-neoliberal and semi-structuralist
and that, since 2005, he has declared his intentions to be socialist.
Regardless of the ambiguity surrounding 21st Century Socialism
(LÓPEZ MAYA, 2007), he has been clear about pressuring domestic
and foreign private corporations, invited foreign state-owned
corporations to be part of mixed partnerships, and has recently engaged
in the nationalization of the phone company, electrical company,
various petroleum projects, and a major cement company. Monetary
policy is thoroughly managed by the government which generally
pursues considerably expansionary policies and then suddenly
contracts sharply when inflation rises (as was the case in early 2008).
The foreign exchange rate is very overvalued, it is now criminal to
discuss or publish a rate other than the official exchange rate, and
Venezuelans must apply for permission to purchase dollars at the
official exchange rate. Like monetary policy, fiscal policy has been
excessively procyclical.
Venezuela under Hugo ChÆvez is an increasingly managed
republic, one that maintains significant tensions between democratic
and authoritarian tensions. Ironically, it is not these tensions that
prevent the system from being embedded. Rather it is the very
significant resistance of, at least, a large minority to the policy style
and direction of the regime. That said, tensions were much higher
between 1999 and 2004, especially beginning in 2001 when the
National Assembly gave ChÆvez wide-ranging enabling powers 
which allowed him to circumvent the Assembly. Over the next few
years, the government suffered a decline in popularity, a coup, a
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three-month long strike among petroleum workers and a recall refe-
rendum. By late 2003, government popularity began to recover and,
with the increase in petroleum revenues, the government was able
to increase social spending and establish its pro-poor identity. Since
the very serious defeat of the recall referendum in 2004, government
opponents seem to accept the government as legitimate, even while
considering it detestable. The opposition boycotted the elections of
2005 but competed in the presidential elections in 2006 and
triumphed in the referendum of 2007. During this time, the loyal
members of the opposition have gained ground versus the disloyal
ones, or rather, opponents who favored institutional challenges to the
regime gained space over those who favored extra and anti-insti-
tutional means. This, however, does not mean that anti-institutional
means have been ruled out or that political elites, analysts, and, even
the president himself, do not discuss the possibility of his being
removed from or resigning from office before 2013 (when his
mandate ends) or his maintenance in office beyond 2013 (which, at
this point, would be unconstitutional). Given the relative stability and
acceptance, or at least tolerance, of the current regime, resulting
from numerous elections and victories over very real challenges to
its legitimacy, the regime has a semi-embedded status. It continues to
be semi-embedded because the president has radicalized his agenda
at points when opposition waned, which quickened more radical
members of the opposition, and because the regime is entirely
centered on the figure of president ChÆvez who is (for now) unable to
run for the presidency in 2012, creating a succession problem.
5 Final Considerations
Do Bachelet, Lula, and ChÆvez represent different lefts, is one
of them the real left, are some more left than the others? These are
very important questions for analysts and scholars. But the fact that
these questions emerge allows broader, more macrolevel questions to
surface. Scholars engaging in comparative inquiry have been in the
uncomfortable position of trying to understand and explain politics,
economics, and social problems in a world full of countries that
increasingly use elections as a means of legitimating regimes. This has
problematized many typologies which assign labels such as demo-
cracy and authoritarian, leading to a rather anarchic proliferation
of adjectival regimes. Recent efforts to impose a classificatory order
by scholars such as Diamond (2002), Levitsky and Way (2002), and
Smith and Ziegler (2008) are important in identifying weaknesses in
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the literature and possible solutions. This essay builds on their work
to offer a typology which can account for greater differences within
regimes as well as identifying their relative legitimacy.
Using this typology, the Chilean government is an embedded
liberal democracy and the Brazilian and Venezuelan governments
are semi-embedded managed republics. However, the variables used
here are continuous and Venezuela and Brazil are rather distant in terms
of quality of citizen participation and how liberal and embedded the
regime is, with the Brazilian government having a significantly higher
degree of each of these variables than its Venezuelan counterpart.
This helps not only understand Bachelet, Lula, and ChÆvez, but also
their opponents, the choices of their electorates, and the potential
for change within each country. That is, this typology aims to help
organize a universe of political data in a meaningful way. It should
be noted that it does not do so with any explicit preference of with
any explicit for one type of regime over another. It merely aims to
link together regimes that have like dynamics in terms of citizen
autonomy and government management.
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